This paper studies the evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games within environments of stochastically varying games. Essentially, i t i s s h o wn that many of the \folk results" of evolutionary game theory, t ypically obtained with a xed game, carry over to corresponding stochastic dynamics over rules for playing stochastically varying games. The results are also related to recent experiments on rules and games.
Introduction
We consider a framework that is a natural and straightforward extension of the standard framework of evolutionary game theory. Rather than xing a game that is played repeatedly either in continuous or discrete time (with or without perturbations), with strategies corresponding to strategies (pure or mixed) of the xed game, we consider a class of games G from which a new game is randomly and independently drawn each period according to a xed probability distribution . A g e n ts play the games according to rules, which w e take to be algorithms prescribing a strategy (possibly mixed) for any game from G that may appear. An interesting feature of the framework is that rules are no longer simply stategies of a given game, but are algorithms that may in principle have applicability that goes beyond the class G and may h a ve deeper cognitive i n terpretations. For example, a rule could be the prescription to play the strategy that is a best response to a uniform distribution over the other players' pro les at the drawn game, after all strictly dominated strategies have been iteratedly eliminated or, it may b e the strategy that would lead to the highest possible joint p a yo of the drawn game. What is restrictive is the class of games G and the distribution .
Within this setup, we c o n s i d e r e v olution of rules from a given set and thus model agents learning or updating the probability with which t o p l a y t h e given rules depending on how they perform on the randomly selected games. (In particular, we do not consider here the case where agents may learn or invent rules from some unspeci ed set.) Thus, rules become strategies in a game of rules against rules, and one can take p a yo s between rules to be simply the -expected payo of following the given rules against the other players' pro les of rules. This leads to what we c a l l a n a verage game.
Since games are drawn randomly each p e r i o d , o u r e v olutionary process is a stochastic process in discrete time. For simplicity, w e consider aggregate log-monotonic dynamics (see Cabrales and Sobel (1992) ) and show t h a t t h e resulting stochastic dynamics of rules satis es some basic folk-properties of evolutionary game theory (see Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003) ). In particular, we s h o w that rules which are strictly dominated in the average game, are played with probability zero almost surely in the limit similarly for iteratively strictly dominated strategies. Further, we s h o w that if the stochastic dynamics converges, then the limit rule pro le must be a Nash equilibrium of the average game. These results have counterparts for example in Nachbar (1990), Friedman (1991) , Samuelson and Zhang (1992) , and Cabrales and Sobel (1992) . They are shown using the strong law of large numbers for martingale di erence sequences. We a l s o s h o w that pure Nash equilibrium rule pro les of the average game that are asymptotically stable under the deterministic aggregate log-monotonic dynamics are stochastically asymptotically stable under the stochastic dynamics. This implies that strict equilibrium rule pro les of the average game are stochastically asymptotically stable under our stochastic dynamics. This also has counterparts for example in Nachbar (1990) and Ritzberger and Weibull (1996) . It is not the case, however, that all Nash equilibria are restpoints of the stochastic dynamics indeed, mixed equilibrium rule pro les need not be. This is thus a folk result that does not carry over to this stochastic setting. Finally, w e s h o w t h a t if empirical frequencies of the stochastic dynamics converge, then the limit point m ust be in the Hannan set (this is de ned in the text it contains the set of correlated equilibria). It is still open whether empirical frequencies always converge to the Hannan set, but we can exclude that they will in general converge to the set of correlated equilibria.
The present paper relates to several strands of literature. Concerning stochastically changing games (or systems), there is a large literature studying perturbed games (for example, Foster and Young (1990), Fudenberg and Harris (1992) , Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) , Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) , Benaim and Hirsch (1999) , Cabrales (2000) , Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) ). Much of the emphasis of these papers, rather than modelling players learning algorithms or rules to play in di erent e n vironments, focus on using noise to obtain either selection or convergence results.
Some exceptions to this are Rosenthal (1979) , who considers agents playing sequences of games with possibly varying opponents and derives conditions ensuring Markov stationarity properties are satis ed. Also, Rosenthal (1993a,b) studies rules of thumb for playing in random-matching games and characterizes certain steady-state equilibria. Li Calzi (1995) considers agents playing di erent games and studies what he calls ctitious play b y cases, which speci cally models how a g e n ts may draw on experience from playing similar games in the past via a ctitious play algorithm he shows almost sure convergence of his process for 2 2 games. Samuelson (2001) considers agents playing di erent games with rules (or models to represent t h e e n vironments, in his case these are automata with varying states) that are optimal subject to complexity costs. He also studies the evolution of the automata and how they play in equilibrium. Sgroi and Zizzo (2003) take a di erent approach and model the learning process of neural networks having to play randomly drawn 3 3 games the neural networks are previously trained to play N a s h equilibrium. A v ery closely related paper is Heller (2004) , which studies the evolution of simple rules vs rules that allow agents to learn their environment. The paper derives conditions on the costs associated with learners' rules guaranteeing that, within changing environments, learners survive i n the long run.
Finally, also closely related are the papers in the experimental literature, for example, Stahl and Wilson (1995) , Stahl (1999) 2003), who test speci cally for the rules agents may employ or learn to employ when playing di ering games. We will come back to these later.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the framework and notation, Section 3 contains all the results and some examples, Section 4 concludes.
Framework and Preliminary Notions
Let I = f1 :: ng denote the set of players, S i player i's space of pure strategies, S = i2I S i the space of pure strategy pro les, and let i denote the set of probability measures on S i , = i2I i the space of mixed strategy pro les. Let also S ;i = j6 =i S j , a n d ;i = j6 =i j and set K i = # S i for the number of i's strategies, K = P i2I K i , a n d = i2I K i the number of possible outcomes. In what follows, we consider nite normal form games, i.e., where n and each K i are nite, and x both the set of players and the set of strategy pro les, so that we can identify a game with a point in Euclidean space 2 IR n . W e also denote by i 2 IR the payo array o f p l a yer i and, by slight abuse of notation, also the payo function of player i at game . N( ) denotes the set of Nash equilibria of .
We are interested in rules for playing arbitrary games within given subspaces G IR n . W e view rules as being algorithms that for any game 2 G prescribe a strategy of player i for that game. Formally, w e de ne a rule for player i as a map r i : G ! i , i 2 I. As with strategies for individual games, we let R i denote a nite list of rules, R = i2I R i the space of rule pro les, and we denote by R i the set of probability measures on R i R = i2I R i is the space of mixed rule pro les with generic element . Given a subset G IR n and a probability measure on G, w e can assess the performance of given rules on games in G by computing the expected payo s from playing the individual games that are drawn according to the probability measure . Throughout the paper we assume the set G to be compact. This leads to the following notion of an average game.
De nition 1 Let G IR n be a c ompact set of games, let be a p r obability measure o n G, and let R denote a nite space of rules. The average game 1 is de ned b y :
As we will see in the next sections, important properties of the learning behavior of rules, given such a n environment (G R), can be derived from the associated average game 1 . Example 1. Take G to be the space of all 2 2 games with payo s in 0 1], and take to be such that all payo s are drawn according to independent uniform distribution on 0 1]. Many rules can be de ned here. In this and the next example, we consider some of the rules studied in an experimental context for example by Stahl and Wilson (1995) and Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) . In the latter's terminology, three of the simpler (nonstrategic) rules, are: \Naive" (N1), \Pessimistic" (P1), and \Altruistic" (A1), which, for each g a m e 2 G, recommend respectively, N1: the strategy that best replies to beliefs assigning equal probability to opponent's actions, P1: the \maxmin" strategy that maximizes the minimum of own payo s, and A1: the strategy that maximizes joint p a yo s. 1 The rule pro les N1 and A1 constitute pure Nash equilibria of the average game. The \maxmin" rule P1 is strictly dominated by N1. Notice how t h e average game need not have a n y resemblance with any of the individual games in G.
Given an average game, we can de ne standard (deterministic) dynamics, which, as we will see, are useful in evaluating limiting properties of the stochastic dynamics (to be introduced in the next section) on the underlying environment ( G R).
De nition 2 (Discrete) Aggregate Log-Monotonic Dynamics on 1
where i : R ! IR + i s a c ontinuous function, bounded away from zero. We refer to the dynamics de ned in (1) simply as the average dynamics.
Though we are not committed to this particular form of dynamics (it is studied, e.g., in Cabrales and Sobel (1992)), we use it in the proofs (we view Camerer and Ho (1999) and Hopkins (2002) as providing some indirect, empirical and theoretical, support for using such a dynamics).
Stochastic Learning of Rules
We consider a process of stochastic learning of rules that occurs over games that are drawn randomly from G according to the probability measure . I n this context, starting from an initial distribution of rules 0 2 R within the population of players, we consider a learning process that is an application or extension of the aggregate log-monotonic selection dynamics applied to this stochastic context. The weights with which rules are played are updated according to the relative performances of the rules on the randomly drawn games such a rule is also referred to as exponential weighted average rule it is also closely related to the logistic learning rule (e.g., Camerer and Ho (1999) We refer to the dynamics de ned in (2) as the stochastic dynamics.
Notice that unlike the (deterministic) average dynamics, where the relative performance of a given rule is evaluated with the xed average game 1 , h e r e the relative performance at t is evaluated with the randomly drawn game t . Our rst result shows that rules that are strictly dominated in the average game tend to disappear under the stochastic dynamics. This is a counterpart to Nachbar (1990) , Friedman (1991) , Samuelson and Zhang (1992) , and, in particular, Cabrales and Sobel (1992) and Cabrales (2000) . Notice that a rule may be strictly dominated in the average game although it never recommends a dominated strategy in any of the randomly drawn games.
Proposition 1 Let 1 be the average game for the environment (G R).
If r i k 2 R i is strictly dominated i n 1 for some i 2 I, a n d f t g follows some stochastic aggregate log-monotonic dynamics with 0 ;! 0. Proof. If player i already has a rule r ì 2 R i that strictly dominates r i k in 1 , then this is the case of the previous proposition. If not, then consider a rule that prescribes the same strategies as r i k on GnG 0 and prescribes a strictly dominating strategy on G 0 . L e t R be the space of rule pro les with this rule added to R i . Then since (G 0 ) > 0, the described rule strictly dominates r i k on the corresponding game 0 1 and the previous proposition implies i k t a:s:
;! 0 i f 0 2 int(R). 2 Example 2. Adding the rules \Best Reply to Naive" (N2), \Best Reply to Altruistic" (A2), \Naive After One Round Dominance" (D1), and \Risk Dominant Nash" (RDN) to the environment of Example 1, 2 where only the rule RDN survives iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. 3 Hence, by Proposition 1 all these rules except for RDN would be played with probability zero in the limit of stochastic dynamics within this expanded environment. One may suspect from this that rules that do not recommend Nash strategies on a subset of G of full measure can be dominated by appropriately designed rules within some expanded environment. However, as the following simple example demonstrates, this is not true in general.
Example 3. Consider the (degenerate) environment where the game below is played repeatedly every period. This game has three Nash equilibria: two pure, where players play strategies 1 and 3, and a mixed equilibrium where player 1 mixes between strategies 1 and 2 and player 2 mixes between 1 and 3. In particular, player 2's strategy 2 is not a Nash equilibrium strategy. Next, consider the rules for player 1, N1 and N2 (these coincide with strategies 1 and 3 respectively), and for player 2, N1 and A1 (these coincide with strategies 3 and 2 respectively). These lead to the average game
which has the property that no matter how one extends the space of rules, it is impossible to do so in a way t h a t w i l l l e a d t o a n y one of the above rules of players 1 and 2 being strictly (or even weakly) dominated in the resulting extended average game. In particular, player 2's rule A1 that (always) recommends a non-Nash strategy cannot be dominated in any expanded environment. The reason is that if a new rule for player 2 ever recommends a di erent strategy than A1, then the payo of this strategy against either N1 or N2 (or both) will have to decrease. The same applies to the other rules. Moreover, while the environment here consists of a single game that is drawn every period (with probability one), it is easy to see that one can for example take G to be a (su ciently small) compact neighborhood of the above 3 3 g a m e w i t h a n y probability measure on G, a n d t h e a b o ve still goes through. We next consider the issue of convergence of the stochastic dynamics to Nash equilibria. Notice that our log-monotonic dynamics is uncoupled in the sense of Hart and Mas-Colell (2003b), i.e., the weight put by p l a yer i on rule k at time t depends only on the rule pro le ;i t;1 at t ; 1 and on player i's payo s in the current g a m e t . In particular, it does not directly depend on the payo s of any of the other players. Hart and Mas-Colell show t h a t such a dynamics cannot in general (and generically in the space of games) guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium. T h us, except for speci c games, like t wo-player potential or zero-sum games, one should not expect the logmonotonic dynamics to converge to Nash equilibrium of the average game. However, analogous to Nachbar (1990), Friedman (1991) , and Samuelson and Zhang (1992), we show that if the process does converge, then the limit point must be a Nash equilibrium of the average game. ;! and i k > 0. 2
The next result shows that if initial rule distribution 0 is close enough to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the average game, then, in the limit, the stochastic dynamics will converge to that equilibrium almost surely. T h e next de nition is based on Arnold (1974).
De nition 4 Let 2 R be a z e r o of the dynamics f t g, then we say is stochastically stable if for every neighborhood V of and for every > 0, there exists a neighborhood U of , U V of strictly positive measure, such that P t 2 V , t > 0] 1; whenever 0 2 U is stochastically unstable if it is not stochastically stable.
We say is stochastically asymptotically stable if it is stochastically stable and lim
Proposition 3 Let 1 be the average game for the environment (G R) and let f t g follow some stochastic aggregate log-monotonic dynamics. If 2 R is a regular pure Nash equilibrium of 1 that is asymptotically stable under the corresponding average dynamics, then is stochastically asymptotically stable under f t g. Proof. It su ces to show that for every 0 < < there exists a neighborhood U ( ) s u c h that P lim t!1 t = ] 1 ; 8 0 2 U ( ). Consider the processes f t g, f t g, a n d f~ t g de ned respectively by (1), 
all with the same initial distribution 0 . In the latter process,~ t+1 is computed based on the average game and assuming other players play according to t it will serve a s a n a p p r o ximation to the stochastic dynamics.
Since is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, w e m a y assume i = ( 1 0 : : 0), Since G is compact, the factor by which t h e w eight put on any strategy k can grow from a period to the next is bounded. Next, choose T su ciently large such t h a t P k t+1 ; t k + k t+2 ; t k ( e ) T 2 k t ; k] = 1 : (5) Because of the multiplicative form of the dynamics, for any g i v en T > 0 we c a n c hoose > 0 su ciently small such t h a t
Finally, the process flog( t );log(~ t )g is a martingale di erence sequence to which the Hoe ding-Azuma inequality applies, so that assuming = , But because at each the process starts anew at the deterministic point 0 (S ;1 ), each of the events are independent and hence the Hoe ding-Azuma inequality is applied independent times, so that with probability a t l e a s t It is now easy to see that the process is stochastically asymptotically stable. 2
One positive feature of the present framework is that convergence of the process f t g to a pure strategy rule pro le can be interpreted as the players learning to play the individual rules corresponding to that pro le. In particular, if for example the rule corresponds to a Nash algorithm, then this means learning (or converging to) the actual algorithm that prescribes a Nash equilibrium strategy for every game drawn from G. Moreover, the algorithms may be applicable even to games outside of G.
The following example shows that the Proposition 3 does not hold for mixed equilibria that are asymptotically stable in the average game. This game has a unique mixed equilibrium, which is asymptotically stable under the average dynamics if for example 1 = 2 = 1 . H o wever, it can be checked that, the stochastic dynamics, even if it starts at the mixed equilibrium, leaves any su ciently small neighborhood with probability o n e . Since strict Nash equilibria are always in pure strategies and asymptotically stable under the log-monotonic selection dynamics, we h a ve the following corollary, (this is analogous to Nachbar (1990) and Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) ;! p, since the probability of all outcomes involving strategies other than r ì would have t o c o n verge to zero, yet at least one other is positive and bounded away from zero. 2
Hart and Mas-Colell (2003a) provide a whole class of adaptive dynamics (based on average regrets) whose empirical frequencies converge to the Hannan set (i.e., are Hannan consistent, or universally consistent, see Fudenberg and Levine (1998) ). It can be checked that our log-monotonic dynamics are based on cumulative and not average regrets, so that Hart and Mas-Colell's do not apply directly. It is still an open question whether or not our dynamics are Hannan consistent. What we c a n s a y is that empirical frequencies will not in general converge to the set of correlated equilibria.
Example 5. Consider the (degenerate) environment where the game below is played repeatedly every period with the rules corresponding to the pure strategies of the game. property that the empirical frequencies of the outcomes on the diagonal converge to zero. In particular, the empirical frequencies do not converge to the (unique) correlated equilibrium, which puts probability 1 9 on every outcome.
Conclusion
The present framework can be extended in many w ays. Some obvious ones consist in dropping some of the stationarity assumptions built into the model. For instance, one could consider rules that can be made contingent on past behavior. One could also consider the distribution changing over time.
On the other hand, one could generalize the class of dynamics and test whether folk results shown for the log-monotonic dynamics carry over to further classes, for example, the smooth ctitious play dynamics. However, we think the main challenges lie in characterizing \good" rules on one hand, and in modelling the process of learning (or developing) rules without being previously given the set of rules. The experiments of Selten et al. (2003) go in this direction. The neural network approach o f S g r o i a n d Zizzo (2003), while conceptually quite di erent from the one of the present paper, also can be seen as going somewhat in this direction.
